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first appear. If the creditors think that the referee is unreasonable in his
disapproval, the machinery of the act enables them to have this disapproval
reviewed by the district court.92 If the district court should uphold the referee's
disapproval, which it will not do if it finds that the referee was arbitrary,03
then to remit the matter to the creditors would negate the express congressional
purpose9 4 of avoiding a second creditors' meeting.

POST-PETITION INTEREST ON TAX CLAIMS
In 1873, the Merchants' Bank of Canada claimed that the bankrupt Oliver
Bugbee was indebted to it in the sum of 15,030.85 dollars. The bank argued
that it was entitled to interest on its claim to the date of payment, but the
court ruled that interest could not run beyond the date of the petition in
bankruptcy.'
In 1906, a North Dakota district court established an exception to this rule by
allowing a tax claim to bear interest until paid. 2 While taxes no longer enjoy
this particular privilege in bankruptcy,3 the treatment of interest on taxes still
differs from that of interest on ordinary debts. The present state of the law
merits examination.
I.

HiSTORICAL BACKGROUND

Over two hundred years ago, the English courts considered the basic problem
of how to treat interest accruing between the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy and the payment of the debt. A cut-off rule was established,
4
prohibiting the payment of any such interest out of the bankrupt estate.
In 1911, the Supreme Court, in Sexton v. Dreyfus,5 established the cut-off
rule as part of the American system of bankruptcy. The Court characterized the
rule as a "fundamental principle,"6 and reasoned that, since the American
system of bankruptcy was derived from the English, the fundamentals of the
92.
93.
94.

Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 52 Stat. 858 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1964).
E.g., In the Matter of Eloise Curtis, Inc., 326 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1964).
See note 37 supra.

1. In re Bugbee, 4 Fed. Cas. 609, 612 (No. 2115) (N.D.N.Y. 1874).
2. In re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276 (DN.D). 1906).
3. See notes 29-36 infra and accompanying text.
4. "[T]he usual rule is, that all interest on debts carrying interest shall cease from the
time of issuing the commission . . . ." 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *488. See Bromley v.
Goodere, 1 Atk. 75, 26 Eng. Rep. 49 (Ch. 1743); Ex Parte Bennet, 2 Atk. 527, 26 Eng.
Rep. 716 (Ch. 1743).
5. 219 U.S. 339 (1911). The case arose when a secured creditor had his security sold
and then attempted to apply the proceeds to post-petition interest and to collect the remainder of the debt in bankruptcy. The Court held that the proceeds of the sale of the
security must be used to pay the principal of the debt and that interest accruing after
the petition would not be allowed.
6. Id. at 344.
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latter were incorporated into the former, "somewhat as the established construction of a law goes with the words where they are copied by another State. The policy reasons justifying the rule are:
(a) The delay in payment is not the act of the debtor but is an act of law for the
mutual benefit of the creditors. (b) In the case of claims bearing different rates of
interest, it would be inequitable to permit the running of interest to increase the
proportion of the assets to which some of the creditors are entitled at the espense
of the other creditors while the estate is in the proces;s of administration. (c) If all
claims bear the same rate of interest, the addition of interest would not change the
proportion of assets to which each would be entitled, and the computation may
therefore be omitted as a useless act.A further rationale is that the rule serves administrative convenience by avoiding frequent computation of interest to the date of payment of claims
Three exceptions to the rule are generally recognized. When it is discovered
that an estate in bankruptcy is more than sufficient to pay the principal of all
debts with interest to the date of filing, then any surplus will be applied to
post-petition interest before returning the remainder to the debtor o Further,
secured creditors are usually allowed interest to the date of sale of the security
if the proceeds are sufficient." Finally, "if the collateral is of an interest-bearing
7. Ibid. The rule, with certain exceptions, has gcnLrally been fulluwed. E.g., City of
New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949); Vanston Bondholdcr3 Protective Comm. v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946); National Foundry Co. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 229
F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956); Meinhard, Greeff & Co. v. Brown, 199 F2d 70 (4th Cir. 1952);
In re Smith-Flynn Comm'n Co., 292 Fed. 465 (Sth Cir. 1923); In re Bugbce, 4 Fed. Cas.
609 (No. 2115) (N.DIN.Y. 1374); Bruning v. United Statc, 376 U.S. 353 (1964) (dictum).
See generally 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 1 63.16[1], at 1354-63 (14th cd. 1964) [hcrcinaftcr cited
as Colier]. The rule has been extended to require a rebate of interest when a non-interest
bearing debt was due after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. For example, if a
petition in bankruptcy was filed one year before a .i'j10 non-interect bearing debt was
due, and if the debt were paid on the date of filing, it would be fair to give the creditor
6% less than $100 because he would have use of the money fur one year more than contemplated. Since no interest accrues after the date of filing, the creditor receives this reduced
amount regardless of when he is paid. See In re Orne, 13 Fed. Cas. 321, 322 INo. 10531)
(S.D N.Y. 1S67).

3. Littleton v. Kincaid, 179 F.2d 343, 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 309 (1950).
9. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 32k) U.S. 156, 164 11946). This,
factor is of greater importance in arrangement proceedings. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
10. E.g., Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed. 459 (5th Cir. 1911), appeal dismiszed 232 U.S.
715 (1913), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 723 (1914). In Johnson, the debtor argucd that his
discharge required the surplus to be turned over to him, but the court's result vas juztified
alternately on the basis of "the general purpose of the bankruptcy law, or by the general
principles of equity .... ." 190 Fed. at 466. For a discussiun of this exccption, -c 3
Collier F163.16[], at 1860-61.
11. E.g., Coder v. Arts, 152 Fed. 943, 950 (Sth Cir. 19 07), aft'd, 213 US. 223 f1,G9).
The Supreme Court's affirmance did not discuss thL livint. and at lvast une c-urt ha:
doubted whether the Supreme Court has ever recognL!d this vic r-tion. United States v.
Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 722-24 (4th Cir. 1959). The exception apparently w:as noted,
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kind and yields interest or dividends in the interval between the filing date and
to the payment of interest on the debt
the sale, this interest may be 1 applied
2
accruing after the filing date.'

II. TAxEs: A FOURTH EXCEPTION?
A. City of New York v. Saper'3
The case of In re Kallak"4 excepted federal, state, and local taxes from the
general rule, and allowed them to bear interest until paid.1r The court distinguished taxes from ordinary debts that come within the general rule, because
taxes were not then a claim as defined in the Bankruptcy Act.10 Furthermore,
the court was apparently impressed that the act then gave the trustee in bankruptcy the duty to discover and pay all taxes due,' 7 rather than requiring the
various tax claimants to prove the debtor's liability in the bankruptcy court,
as other creditors were required to do. Further evidence of the dignity of tax
debts was their non-dischargeability' 8 and their first priority in the distribution
of the estate. 19 The court concluded that the reasons for generally cutting off
interest at the date of filing did not apply to tax claims. 20
On the same day that Kallak was decided, another federal court reached the
opposite conclusion. 21 There, the court merely stated that post-petition interest
however, in Vanston Protective Bondholders Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), where
the Court observed that "simple interest on secured claims accruing after the petition was
filed was denied unless the security was worth more than the sum of principal and interest
due." Id. at 164. (Citation omitted.) Inasmuch as the funds paid to secured creditors for
post-petition interest come out of the proceeds that would otherwise go to the general
unsecured creditors, the soundness of this exception has been questioned. United States v.
Harrington, supra at 723. In response, it may be argued that "the collateral is security for
the payment of the interest as much as the payment of the principal." Littleton v. Kincald,
179 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1950), citing Coder v. Arts, supra, and Mortgage Loan Co. v.
Livingstone, 45 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1930). In any event, lower courts generally afford secured
creditors this preferential status. See 3 Collier ff 63.16[1], at 1861-63.
12. 3 id.
63.16[1], at 1861. (Footnote omitted.)
13. 336 U.S. 328 (1949).
14. 147 Fed. 276 (D.N.D. 1906).
15. Id. at 277-79.
16. Bankruptcy Act § 63, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898) (amended by 52 Stat. 873 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1964)).
17. 147 Fed. at 277-78, citing Bankruptcy Act § 64a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 563 (1898)
(amended by 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964)).
18. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35a(l)
(1964).
19. Bankruptcy Act § 64a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 563 (1898).
20. 147 Fed. at 278. It is difficult to see why this conclusion follows from the preferred
status of tax liabilities. Despite taxes not coming within the technical definition of "claim,"
the proceeds used to pay interest on taxes still come from the estate, and, therefore, the
general creditors are prejudiced by the accrual of interest. It is the policy of the cut-off
rule to prevent this result.
21. In re William F. Fisher & Co., 148 Fed. 907 (D.N.J. 1906).
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on tax claims is not expressly provided for in the Bankruptcy Act, and, therefore, such interest would not be allowed.-22 However, the Kallak. decision was
generally followed, "and in time the doctrine was being upheld without dis23
cussion.,
Kallak emphasized the preferred status of taxes under Section 6402 of the
Bankruptcy Act. In 1938, the Chandler Act amended section 64 so as to
relegate taxes to a fourth priority;25 and section 57n was amended to require
filing of tax claims in the same manner as other claims .0 Despite these changes,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Davie v. Grccn,2 allowed post-petition
tax interest, reasoning that, if Congress had wished to deprive taxes of their
interest-bearing quality, it would have done so explicitly
Subsequently, however, the United States Supreme Court, in City of New York v. Sapcr; affirmed
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which had reached the opposite resulLOO
The tax claimants in Saper based their argument for a continuation of the
Kallak exception on section 57j of the act,31 which reads:
Debts owing to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof as a
penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or
forfeiture arose, with reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and such iterest
as may have accrued on the amount of such loss according to law.2It was maintained that this section was part of the basis of the Kallak decision,
that the Supreme Court had sub silentio approved the doctrinep and that
Congress, by substantially re-enacting section 57j, had thereby approved the
Supreme Court's recognition of Kallak.34 The Court correctly replied that
Kallak and the cases following it relied on section 64a rather than on section
57j, and that, therefore, the elimination of section 64a repudiates the basis
22. Id. at 913.
23. 3 Collier U 63.16[2], at 1S63 n.26. (Citation omitted.)
24. Bankruptcy Act § 64a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 563 (1893).
25. 52 Stat. 374 (193S), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
26. 52 Stat. 867 (193S), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1964).
27. 133 F.2d 451 (1st Cir. 1943).
28. Id. at 453. The same result was reached in In re Flayton, 42 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.N.Y.
1942), and in In re L. Gandolfi & Co., 42 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
29. 336 U.S. 323 (1949).
30. Saper v. City of New York, 16S F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1943).
31. 336 U.S. at 332-33. Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting, agreed with the Government's
argument, basing his dissent on the reasoning in Davie v. Green, 133 F.2d 451 (1st Cir.
1943). 336 U.S. at 341.
32. Banlauptcy Act § 57j, 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1964). (Emphais
added.)
33. United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304 (1924), held that a statutory provision of
1% per month interest on delinquent taxes was not a penalty, and, therefore, ws not
barred by § 57j, and was "to be continued during the time of its non-payment ... ." Id. at.
310. See Mleflink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n, 314 U.S. 564 (1942).
34. 336 U.S. at 337.
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of Kallak.3 5 Without Kallak, all that is left is "the long-standing rule against
post-bankruptcy interest [which is] . . .implicit in our current Bankruptcy
Act.",36
B. Application of the Saper Rule to Arrangements and Reorganizations
The Saper case involved a straight bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, it was
unclear whether the Saper rule applied also to Chapter XI arrangements and
Chapter
X reorganizations. In 1950, a Michigan district court, in In re Huff
Co., 3 7 held that Saper did extend to Chapter XI proceedings. In luff, the
Government had filed various tax claims with interest to the date of payment.
The debtor objected to the claim for post-petition interest, and the referee
sustained the objections. Upon the United States' petition for a review of the
referee's order, the district court affirmed.3 8 The court stated that the rules
governing allowance of claims in section 57 of the act and the rules governing
priorities in section 64 were construed by Saper to disallow the Government's
interest claim, and that these sections are applicable to Chapter XI proceedings
by virtue of section 302.39 This section provides that "the provisions of chapters
I to VII, inclusive, of this Act shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with
or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter, apply in proceedings under
. . . [Chapter XI]J. ' 40 The court's conclusion was buttressed by section 352
which, in effect, provides that Chapter XI creditors have no greater rights than
straight bankruptcy creditors. 4' Further, the "orderly administration of the
debtor's estate would be considerably hampered if a contrary view were taken,
by requiring continual re-financing to furnish additional amounts for interest
35. Id. at 335, 337. The claimants also relied on a committee report accompanying a
proposed bill, which stated that the bill was intended to end the Kallak rule as continued
in the Davie case. The Court noted, however, that the report indicated that the committee
believed the Davie case to be contrary to the recent amendments to the act. The Court,
therefore, cited the report as support for its own position. Id. at 338-40.
36. Id. at 332.
37. 96 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 702-03.
40. Bankruptcy Act § 302, 52 Stat. 905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1964).
41. Bankruptcy Act § 352, 52 Stat. 909 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 752 (1964), provides:
"Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the rights, duties, and liabilities
of creditors and of all other persons with respect to the property of the debtor shall be
the same, where a petition is filed
under section 321 of this Act and a decree of adjudication has not been entered in the pending bankruptcy proceeding, as if a decree of adjudication had been entered in such bankruptcy proceeding at the time the petition under thils
chapter was filed, or, where a petition is filed under section 322 of this Act, as If a voluntary petition for adjudication in bankruptcy had been filed
and a decree of adjudication
had been entered at the time the petition under this chapter was filed." The court also
approved the general equitable considerations behind the cut-off rule, and was not impressed
with the argument that the extension of the rule would benefit the debtor. 96 F. Supp.
at 703.
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accruing between the time initial attempts are made by loans or otherwise to
furnish the amount of deposit, and actual deposit of the funds."-,The United States, in arguing for a reversal of the referee's order in the

Huff case, relied on the "absolute priority" rule,43 a "fixed principle,"44 which
requires that any property rights of shareholders be inferior to rights of creditors.
Thus, the rule requires avoidance of any plan upsetting this priorityY: Judge
Woodbury, dissenting in Massachusetts v. Thompson,4 applied this rule to a

situation similar to that in the Huff case. 47 The dissent distinguished straight

bankruptcy, which "has for its purpose the orderly, expeditious and economical

liquidation of the bankrupt's available assets," 48 and arrangement proceedings,
which, "on the other hand, have for their purpose not the liquidation of a
business but its financial rehabilitation .... Thus in bankruptcy the interest
of the owner in the property involved is wiped out, whereas in arrangement
proceedings under Chapter XI it is not."149 Therefore, since "interest is entitled
to the same priority as principal,";' o to allow the debtor to resume ownership
42. Ibid. Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 72 Stat. 821 (1953), 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (1964),
requires the debtor to deposit funds sufficient to pay certain priority claims, including taxes.
Apparently, the court felt that allowing interest to accrue would make the nececzary
amount of funds uncertain, and thereby threaten the success of the arrangement plan.
43. 96 F. Supp. at 703.
44. Id. at 702-03.
45. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 223 U.S. 4S2 (1913), where the Court held that
it was permissible for stockholders and bondholders to buy together corporate property at
a judicial sale, but, "if purposely or unintentionally a single creditor was not paid, or
provided for in the reorganization, he could assert his superior rights a-ainst the subordinate
interests of the old stockholders in the property transferred to the new company ...
Any device, whether by private contract or judicial sale under consent decree, whereby
stockholders were preferred before the creditor was invalid." Id. at 504. Accord, Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 303 U.S. 106 (1939); Louisville Trust Co. v. LouiLville,
N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674 (1899).
46. 190 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
47. 190 F.2d at 11 (dissenting opinion). The majority upheld a referee's order allowing
the Commonwealth's tax claim with interest to the date of banhruptcy and disallowing postpetition interest. The court cited Saper and extended it to the arrangement proceeding at
bar on the basis of the reasoning in United States v. General Eng'r & Mfg. Co, 103 F.2d
So (Sth Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 912 (1952). 190 F.d at 10-11. In General
Eng'r & Mfg., the court reached the same conclusion that was reached in the Huff care, on
substantially the same reasoning. The court concluded: "It seems obvious to us that all
of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act upon which the Supreme Court relied in the Saper
case in demonstrating that tax claims in bankruptcy proceedins are debts and that interest
upon them is allowable only to the date of bankruptcy are equally applicable to proceedings for an arrangement under Chapter XI." 13 F.2d at S3. The Thompson case was decided
before the Supreme Court affirmed this opinion.
4S. 190 F.2d at 11 (dissenting opinion).
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 12 (dissenting opinion), citing Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du DeL, 312
U.S. 510, 527 (1941).
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of his property before paying the Government's tax claim with interest is a
clear violation of the absolute priority rule.
Judge Woodbury's argument, while perhaps once persuasive, is no longer
of any force. The Bankruptcy Act has been amended to avoid applying the
absolute priority rule to arrangement proceedings.r' Further, in 1952, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. General Eng'r & Mfg. Co.,52 approved the
application of Saper to arrangement proceedings.

The arguments for and against allowing post-petition interest on tax claims
in Chapter X reorganization proceedings are substantially similar to those in
arrangement proceedings. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Edens," con-

sidered the problem and could find no basis on which to distinguish Saper and

General Eng'r & Mfg. Co.54 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,

affirmed Edens' extension of the cut-off rule to Chapter X. 5
III. THE

GOVERNMENT AS SECURED CREDITOR

Effectively blocked from collecting post-petition interest, the federal government then attempted to have itself exempted from the general rule, on the
theory that it was a secured creditor. 56 Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code 57 provides for tax liens "upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to" a tax debtor. In a number of cases, the Government has contended that, by filing notice of this lien,5" it becomes a secured
creditor, with the entire estate being the security, and that it is, therefore,
entitled to post-petition interest when the estate has sufficient funds. While it
is clear that the Government's tax lien does make it a secured creditor, the
51. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939), held that the expression
"fair and equitable," now in § 221(2) of the act, 52 Stat. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2)
(1964), required that the absolute priority rule apply to Chapter X corporate reorganizations.
Judge Woodbury reasoned that, since the same phrase was also a requirement for arrangement proceedings, then these proceedings must also satisfy the absolute priority rule. 190
F.2d at 11-12 (dissenting opinion)The requirement continues in corporate reorganizations, but the phrase was eliminated
as a requisite in Chapter XI. See S. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952); H.R.
Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1952). The distinction has been criticized. See Seligson,
Bankruptcy, 1952 Ann. Survey Am. L. 429, 466-68.
52. 342 U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam), affirming 188 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1951).
53. 189 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 912 (1952).
54. 189 F.2d at 877.
55. United States v. Edens, 342 U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam). Edens was followed in
Smith v. Robinson, 343 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1965). The opposite view was taken in In ro
Lexington Homes, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1950), which found support in 6 Collier
I1908, at 2815-19. 94 F. Supp. at 484.
56. For a discussion of this exception, see note 11 supra.
57. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
58. Int. Rev. Code of 1953, § 6323 provides that the tax lien is not valid against certain
priority interests unless notice of it is filed either with the clerk of a federal district court
or in any manner provided for by state law.
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Government has been generally unsuccessful in arguing that its security en-

titles it to post-petition interestP

6 °
is one of the few cases accepting the Government's
In the Matter of Parchem
argument. 6 ' The court refused to draw any distinction between specific, consensual liens and the general tax lien, and interpreted the lien-granting statute
as evidencing congressional intent to allow interest to the date of payment of

62
the claim.

The Fourth, 3 Seventh,6 4 Ninth,ca and Tenth 6 Circuits, and several district
courts, 6 7 have all disallowed post-petition interest in this situation. In a typical
case, United States v. Bass,cs the trustee in bankruptcy paid the entire principal

of the tax claim with interest to the date of the petition. The referee allowed

post-petition interest, and the district court reversed.6 9 On appeal, the court of

appeals did not directly pass upon the Government's contention that there is
no distinction between its lien and those liens entitling the lienor to post-

petition interest. 70 The court stated that the issue was "not simply the nature

59. See notes 63-72 infra and accompanying text.
60. 166 F. Supp. 724 (D. Minn. 1958).
61. Another case is In re Burch, S9 F. Supp. 249 (D. Kan. 1943), decided before Saper,
and a third is In the Matter of Ridgecrest Dev. Co., 129 F. Supp. 703 (S.D. Cal. 1950),
which was overruled in In the Matter of Pollard Bros., 12S F. Supp. 313, 820 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
62. 166 F. Supp. at 729-30.
63. United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959).
64. Matter of Kerber Packing Co., 276 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 19C0).
65. United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1959).
66. See United States v. Mlighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959).
67. In the Matter of Young, 171 F. Supp. 317 (W.D. W-s. 1959); Matter of LyI:ens
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In the Matter of Pollard Bros., 128
F. Supp. S13 (S.D. Cal. 1955); In the Matter of Hankey Baking Co., 125 F. Supp. 673
(W.D. Pa. 1954); In re Industrial Alach. & Supply Co., 112 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
68. 271 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1959).
69. Matter of Cameron, 166 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
70. The Government argued that tax liens and contractual liens are of equal status, and
that the distinction between a "general" tax lien and a "specific" contractual lien was without
merit, since tax liens are both general and specific. 271 F.2d at 131. The Government cited
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 31 (1954); Goggin v. Division of Labor Law
Enforcement, 336 U.S. 11S (1949); Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945);
United States v. City of Greenville, 113 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941). The court rightly
discounted these authorities as not in point since they only dealt "v.ith relative priority of
liened federal tax claims. . . " 271 F.2d at 132. (Emphasis omitted.) Some courts have met
the Government's secured creditor argument by distinguishing the tax lien from other liens.
See, e.g., Matter of Lykens Hosiery Mills, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 895 (S.DMN.Y. 1956), where the
court stated: "A general lien of this type is distinguishable from the specific rccurity
involved in those cases where the courts have seen fit to recognize the existence of an
. The distinction lies in the fact that the specific security involved in the
exception ...
cases where an exception was found was usually the result of a voluntary transaction betveen
the debtor and the creditor and the payment of interest was contemplated by the parties.
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of the lien; rather, it is the proper scope of the exception under which postbankruptcy interest has been allowed on some, but not all, claims secured by
lien." 7' It went on to note that, while the collection of taxes is a desired goal,
it is not to be preferred
to the broad policy of protection of general creditors
72
as expressed in Saper.
The Government's right to interest as a secured creditor has yet to be
authoritatively determined by the Supreme Court. However, the recent case
of Simonson v. Granquist7U lends some support to the majority view on this
issue. The Simonson case dealt with tax penalties rather than interest. The
Court had to resolve a seeming conflict between section 57j, disallowing penalties owing to the United States "except for the amount of the pecuniary loss
sustained,"7 4 and section 67b, declaring statutory liens in favor of the United
States valid against the trustee. 75 Although the tax penalties here were perfected
liens, the Court nevertheless disallowed the penalty in order to protect the
76
general creditors.
This Court, therefore, is reluctant to extend the application of the third exception to allow
interest on a tax lien to the date of payment where the security consists of a general lien
'upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal' belonging to the
bankrupt." Id. at 897-98.
271 F.2d at 132.
72. Ibid. The Government again tried to be excepted as a secured creditor in Columbia
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Columbia had been
through bankruptcy some years before, and was suing the United States for a "carryback"
tax refund. The United States counterclaimed for the post-petition interest that it had not
been paid, reasoning that its right to a set-off amounted to security. The court granted that
secured creditors are excepted from the general rule, but easily distinguished a secured debt
from "the privilege of set-off which in substance comes down to no more than a procedural
economy in the enforcement of mutual obligations." Id. at 934.
In Columbia, the plaintiff had already consummated a Chapter XI arrangement, and had
received its discharge, and, therefore, the facts raised the issue of whether post-bankruptcy
interest was discharged. The court did not specifically consider this problem, although Its
broad statement that Saper stands for "denying the survival of rights of any sort to postbankruptcy interest" does seem to give a tentative answer. Ibid. This problem is considered
at pp. 515-20 infra.
The Government, in Columbia, also attempted to collect interest on the basis of the
plaintiff being solvent. Plaintiff, of course, was solvent in the sense that, upon the consummation of the arrangement plan, and upon being discharged, the total value of his assets
exceeded the value of his non-discharged debts. The court answered that "so to construe
the doctrine is completely to distort its meaning." Ibid. This exception to the rule is meant
to apply in the situation when it appears that the debtor always had sufficient assets to pay
its obligations. Compare Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 821 (Ct. CI. 1959),
where plaintiff had gone through a Chapter X reorganization, but at no time did his
liabilities exceed his assets. Plaintiff subsequently received a carry-back refund less the
amount of post-petition interest. In this case, plaintiff sued for the remainder of the refund
and his petition was dismissed.
73. 369 U.S. 38 (1962).
74. Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1964).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 67b, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964).
76. 369 U.S. at 41.
71.
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The dissent pointed out numerous differences between secured and unsecured
creditors, and concluded:
Congress has thus treated liens as outside the policy of equal treatment of creditors
in bankruptcy.. . .A lienor does not hold simply a first priority; he has "a right
to enforcement independent of bankruptcy" . . . .The Bankruptcy Act deals with
the distribution of unencumbered assets among unsecured creditors. ... Lienholders
need no Bankruptcy Act. Liens are independent of and essentially unaffected by
bankruptcy proceedings. I agree with the court below that liens are unaffected by
77
§ 57j; they are outside its scope.
The majority opinion in Simonson spoke of a policy against punishing the general
creditors by requiring them to pay the bankrupt's penalties.7- There is a
similar, if weaker, policy against allowing post-petition interest at the expense
of general creditors. 7- Further, the dissent, in effect, stands for the invulnerability of lienholders, and includes the Government in this category. The majority
rejected this stance where the Government sought penalties; that it would also
be rejected if interest were in issue seems likely.
11.

INTEREST ON TAx CLAnIS AnXSING DunING THE ADmNISTMAOION
OF THE BANIMRUPT ESTATE

Section 64aeO gives a first priority to the expenses of administration of the
estate, and taxes, of course, are often one of these expenses. t The question
arises whether such a tax claim is entitled to any interest if not paid when
due. The case of Boteler v. Ingels8s has some bearing on this problem. There,
the trustee of the bankrupt business operated motor vehicles without paying
certain licensing and registration fees. The question was whether the estate was
liable for the penalties provided for by state law. The trustee argued that
section 57j disallowed penalties except for the actual pecuniary loss. The
court, nevertheless, found for the state, relying on the Act of June 18, 1934,'
providing that trustees were liable for all taxes in the same manner as if an
individual or corporation were conducting the business. Since an individual
operating this business would have been liable for the penalties, the estate was
likewise liablei 5
77. Id. at 44 (dissenting opinion).
7S. Id. at 40-41.
79. It could be pointed out that the Government's argument is somewhat stronger in the
case of interest, since the general creditors suffer when the usual security holder iL given
interest out of funds which would otherwise be returned to the estate.
80. Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 52 Stat. 874 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
81. E.g., Boteler v. Ingels, 30 U.S. 57 (1939); Michigan v. 'Mchigan Trust Co., 2E U.S.
334 (1932).
82. 30S U.S. 57 (1939).

83. Id. at 59.
S4. 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1964).

85. 308 U.S. at 60-61. It should be noted that Boteler and the Simonson case are not in
conflict since the penalty in Simonson arose before bankruptcy, while the penalty in Boteer
arose during the administration of the estate.
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There is presently a conflict in the circuits on the question of whether the
reasoning of Boteler extends to liability for interest. In United States v. Nicholas,86 the court held that it did. A petition for an arrangement was filed on
August 6, 1958, and certain taxes were required to be returned at later dates.
The trustee did not file the returns, and the referee disallowed interest on the
Government's claim for assessed taxes as an administration expense. The court
of appeals reversed, concluding that "the principle announced in the Boteler case
clearly applies here ....,,s1

United States v. Kalishmanss reached the opposite result. The court said
that Boteler was inapposite since it dealt "with a 'penalty' as punishment for
wrongdoing," whereas, here, interest as "'compensation for the use or forbearance of money'" was in issue. s9 Therefore, the case was considered to come
within the broad policy of Saper and cases following itY° The court could not see
why the reasons behind Saper were any less forceful when the debt accrues after
bankruptcy.
In neither case is it logical to charge a bankrupt estate a fee for the use of money
when it is the force of law which prevents the return of the principal to the creditor,
rather than the desire of the debtor to retain its use. In light of the policy enunciated
in Saper, we believe the referee was correct in denying interest on this tax claim.9 1
The difference between the two cases has been aptly stated as follows:
In the Eighth Circuit, as a result of Kalishman, the trustee in bankruptcy can apparently protect himself by making prompt filing of tax returns . .

.

. By doing

this, the trustee will not be subject to either interest or penalties.
In the Fifth Circuit, the trustee in bankruptcy can only protect himself by filing

86. 346 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. Week 3245 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1966)
(No. 650).
87. 346 F.2d at 35. There was an additional element in the case, namely, that the taxes
had accrued while the debtor was in possession of the property. The trustee argued that the
claims should therefore be treated as if they arose prior to bankruptcy. The court ruled,
however, that a debtor allowed to remain in possession is in the same position as a trustee.
Id. at 34-35.
88. 346 F.2d 514 (8th Cir.), appeal docketed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3196 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1965)
(No. 711).
89. 346 F.2d at 519, quoting from Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940). In
Kalishman, as in Nicholas, the tax liability arose while the debtor was In possession of
the property. The Nicholas court thought this irrelevant, see note 87 supra, but the
Kalishman court wrote: [MVe must not consider the debt here incurred by the debtor
in possession as though it were contracted by the trustee during bankruptcy." 346 F.2d
at 518. It is unlikely that the court relied to any great extent on this distinction; If It
did, it would not have been necessary to distinguish Boteler on the basis of penalty as
opposed to interest, since there was the more basic distinction of a debt incurred by a
trustee as opposed to the bankrupt.
90. Id. at 519. The Nicholas case did not even mention Saper and its companion cases.
91. Id. at 520. The United States here also relied on the trust fund doctrine of City of
New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942), and the cases following it. The court
distinguished these cases since the principal of the debt had been paid.
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tax returns and making payment of the
taxes. Otherwise, he is apparently subject
902
to payment of both interest and taxes.

It would seem that the Kalishman case reached the proper result. In matters
of bankruptcy, provisions of the Bankruptcy Act prevail over all other statutes
in the event of conflict.1-3 The policy against post-bankruptcy interest," implicit
in and fundamental to the act, should be entitled to the same status. The
authority for the result in Nicholas, the Act of June 1, 1934, providing for
trustees to be taxed as individuals would be,oa should be subordinate to the broad
rule of Saper.
V. THE DEBTOR'S PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR INTEREST ON TAx CLwms
Section 17 of the act provides that tax liabilities are not affected by a discharge, 6 and section 371 incorporates this provision into Chapter XI arrange-

ments.9 7 Sometimes a tax claimant who has received part or full payment of
the principal of his claim will sue for the remaining principal plus post-petition
interest in an ordinary action outside of bankruptcy. That is, the issue is not
whether post-petition interest is allowable against the bankrupt estate, but
whether such interest may be recovered in a personal action against the debtor.

This issue was resolved in favor of the debtor in Sword Line, Inc. v. Industrial
Comz'r. 9s There, a confirmed plan of arrangement allowed New York State's
claim for taxes with interest to the date of the filing of the petition, and the
state sought to collect post-petition interest outside of the bankruptcy court.P
The debtor sought and obtained an order from the referee enjoining any such
92. Strasheim, Post-Adjudication Interest and Penalties on Taxes Incurred as Expew-n
of
Administration During Superseded Debtor-Relief Proceedings, 39 Ref. J. 113, 115 (1965).

93.

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greenbaum, 223 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United

States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955). It might at first appear that Botler v.
Ingels, 30S U.S. 57 (1939), see text accompanying notes 82-S5 supra, is contra in applying the
Act of June 18, 1934, rather than § 57j of the Bankruptcy Act to a bankruptcy situation.
However, the Court was careful to point out that § 57j only applied to claims arising before
bankruptcy, and there was, therefore, no conflict. 30S US. at 59-60.
94. Obviously, this policy would not apply to interest as consideration for a loan obtained
to finance an arrangement or reorganization plan. See, e.g., Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 US. 625,
632 (1913) (semble).

95. 23 U.S.C. § 960 (1964).
96. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), 52 Stat. 851 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35a(1) (1964).
A discharge is intended "to relieve the honest debtor from the wdght of oppre-hve indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes." Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 US. 549, 554-45
(1915). The debtor has a right to be discharged from all his debts provable under § 63,
30 Stat. 562 (1S93), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1964), except those specified in § 17a(1),
unless he is guilty of certain misconduct as specified in § 14, 30 Stat. 550, as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 32 (1964). See Nadler, Bankruptcy § 730 (2d ed. 1965).
97. Bankruptcy Act § 371, 66 Stat. 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
98. 212 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 830 (1954).
99. 212 F.2d at 866.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

proceedings by the state. 100 This order was subsequently sustained by the court
of appeals. The state's argument was that interest in bankruptcy proceedings
is only "suspended," and that this suspension is irrelevant outside of bankruptcy.- 0 ' Whether or not the cut-off rule could be characterized as a suspension
of interest did not interest the court. 0 2 The substance of the matter is that
interest stops with the filing of the petition, with certain well-recognized exceptions. The court reasoned that to hold that section 17 does not discharge
post-petition interest would be to frustrate the effect of Saper.10 3 It illustrated
this by referring to one of its recent decisions, 04 wherein it had approved a
plan of reorganization which provided six per cent interest on the state's claini
rather than the nine per cent required by statute:
It is obvious that we could not properly have affirmed the approval of the plan,
which made no provision for the contingency, if the law would permit the State to
make later collection of the additional amount. But in fact we referred to the
principle that even governmental priorities were "fully discharged upon consum.
mation of the final plan of reorganization"; said that "it would seem anomalous that
sometime later there might be a revivification of priorities once terminated"; and
held the matter settled in favor of the power exercised by the trial judge under the
Saper ruling that Congress had assimilated taxes to other debts "'for all purposes,
including denial of post-bankruptcy interest.' "10r

Finally, not allowing interest to be paid out of the estate, only to have it later
collected0 7 from the bankrupt himself, is too "pyrrhic a result"'10 to be sus-'
tained.
The dissent in Sword Line was as aware as the majority of the inequities of
100. Id. at 865.
101. Id. at 869. The rule allowing post-petition interest when it is discovered that the
estate is solvent is some support for this view.
102. Id. at 870. "The principle that interest stops running from the date of the filing of
the petition . . .should be understood as a rule of liquidation practice rather than as a rule
63.16, at 1858.
of substantive law." 3 Collier
103. 212 F.2d at 870.
104. Id. at 868, citing New York v. Feinberg, 204 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1953).
105. 212 F.2d at 869, quoting from City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 337 (1949),
and New York v. Feinberg, 204 F.2d 502, 503 (2d Cir. 1953).
106. Id. at 867.
107. Sword Line was followed in National Foundry Co. v. Director of Internal Revenue,
229 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956), which applied its reasoning to a federal tax claim. See Columbia
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the court said that
Saper, as interpreted by Sword Line and National Foundry Co., stands for "denying the
survival of rights of any sort to post-bankruptcy interest." Id. at 934. In United States v.
Mighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959), the court resolved the same issue in favor of the
debtor since the Government did not come within any of the three established exceptions to
the rule as discussed in Saper, United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1959), and
United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959). The court here, however, seemed
somewhat misguided in that it did not seem to realize that the cases it discussed dealt with
aliowability of interest in sharing the estate, as opposed to the question of collectibility of
interest from the debtor and his after-acquired assets.
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the state's contention.' 08 It was recognized that a Chapter XI arranged debtor
"may be subjected to huge undischarged claims"':3 and any plan, therefore, is
"undeniably vulnerable.""10 Since tax claims are not discharged, the dissent
would commiserate with the debtor but find for the state: "The courts can
do nothing to overcome this serious defect in Chapter XI. Congress alone, by
future legislation, can remove it.""'
The majority, by stating that nothing specific in the act exempts interest
from being discharged, was, in effect, holding that interest is not a tax, while
the dissent required that interest be considered part of the debt."- 'hile this
question was unsettled, there was much authority for the view that interest is
something different from, and in addition to, the debt itself." 3 The Supreme
Court has recently resolved this question in the case of Bruning v. Unitcd
States." 4 There, the debtor had failed to pay certain assessed taxes and subsequently filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The United States was paid
part of its claim when the estate was distributed. Four years later, the debtor
applied for a tax refund and the Director of Internal Revenue set off the balance
of the assessed taxes plus interest to date. The debtor did not dispute the
Director's deduction of the remaining principal of the debt, but brought suit
to recover the amount of the post-petition interest withheld." 3 The district
court, 116 the court of appeals,"17 and the Supreme Court all held for the
Director. Mr. Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned:
Initially, one would assume that Congress, in providing that a certain type of debt
should survive bankruptcy proceedings as a personal liability of the debtor, intended
personal liability to continue as to the interest on that debt as well as to its principal
amount. Thus, it has never been seriously suggested that a creditor whose claim is
not provable against the trustee in bankruptcy loses his right to interest in a postbankruptcy action brought against the debtor personally. In most situations, interest
870 (dissenting opinion).
109. Ibid.
110. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion). A reorganization plan under Chapter X is not so
vulnerable, since Bankruptcy Act § 228(1), 52 Stat. S99 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 62(l) (1904),
does not incorporate § 17, but rather discharges all debts not provided for in the plan.
10S. 212 F.2d at

111.

212 F.2d at 872 (dissenting opinion).

112. Ibid.
113. Penrose v. United States, is F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1937); Capital Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 23 B.T.A. 84S (1931); see 1 Collier, 9 17.14, at 1610; cf. Commissioner v. Brcyer,
151 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1945); Webster v. Maloney, 114 F. Supp. 726 (DXNJ. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 213 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954). The Board of Tax Appeals in Capital Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, supra at 849, stated that "the interest on a tax is not a tax ... ." This statement vas
quoted favorably in Penrose v. United States, supra at 415. But see Johnson v. Norris, 19D
Fed. 459 (5th Cir. 1911), appeal dismissed, 232 U-. 715, cert. denied, 232 U.S. 723 (1914),
1a
where the court stated that "interest is an incident of, or a part of, the debt . . .
Fed. at 465.
114. 376 U.S. 358 (1964).
115. Id. at 358-60.
116. Bruning v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
117. Bruning v. United States, 317 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1963).
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is considered to be the cost of the use of the amounts owing a creditor and an
incentive to prompt repayment and, thus, an integral part of a continuing debt. Interest
on a tax debt would seem to fit that description. Thus, logic and reason indicate
that post-petition interest on a tax claim excepted from discharge by § 17 of the
Act should be recoverable in a later action against the debtor personally, and there
is no evidence of any Congressional intent to the contrary. 118
The debtor argued that the Government's position was inconsistent with the
humanitarian purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, but the Court noted that a section
exempting debts from discharge obviously has aims other than removing
burdensome debts from the debtor. 119 The debtor also relied on the Saper case,
but Saper was distinguished as dealing with allowability of interest from the
120
bankrupt's estate, while Bruning considered the dischargeability of interest.
Saper was further distinguished on the ground that the other creditors are not
121
at all affected by the debtor's continuing personal liability.
VI. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Once it is decided that interest is an integral part of a debt, the reasoning
in Bruning is logically unassailable. In the light of Saper, however, the result
produced seems anomalous. To illustrate, suppose a bankrupt, at the time of
the filing of the petition, owes a tax debt of 10,000 dollars, and that, by the
time the trustee is able to pay the debt, 1,000 dollars in interest has accrued.
Under Saper, this 1,000 dollars may not be paid out of the estate because to
do so would be unfair to the general creditors. It had seemed that this protection of the general creditors was at the Government's expense, the 1,000 dollars
never to be paid. Bruning, however, held that the interest on a tax debt is not
discharged. Therefore, the burden of the protection in this particular case
falls upon the debtor, since he will eventually have to pay the debt.
The Court in Bruning felt that the non-dischargeability of taxes required
this result. It seems unlikely that section 17122 was so intended. In a situation
where the estate is not sufficient to pay the entire tax claim, it is reasonable to
require that the remainder of the principal be eventually paid by the debtor.
Congress has so required by making taxes non-dischargeable. However, the
effects of section 17 are rarely felt by the debtor, for section 64,123 giving taxes
a high priority, insures that in the usual case the tax claim will be paid in full
before any of the proceeds of the estate are devoted to the debts which will
be discharged. But Saper and section 17, as construed by Bruning, now insure
that, while post-petition interest may not be paid out of the estate, it can later
be collected from the debtor.
118. 376 U.S. at 360.
119. Id. at 361; see 83 Cong. Rec. 9106 (1938) (remarks of Representative Chandler),
indicating that the prevention of tax evasion is one purpose behind § 17.
120. 376 U.S. at 361-62.
121. Id. at 362-63.
122. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35a(l)

(1964).
123.

Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
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A similar result occurs in Chapter XI arrangements. Section 17 is applicable
to arrangement proceedings,' 2 4 and presumably, therefore, the rule of the Brnmizg case will also apply. The Sword Line decision, considering this problem in
an arrangement proceeding, held that the Government could not recover the
interest from the debtor in an ordinary action.2'3 The decision was largely
based upon principles of fairness to the debtor.12" Sword Line is apparently
overruled by Bruning. It would seem that this can have two possible results.
If Bruning is not accounted for in the plan of arrangement, the burden of paying post-petition interest falls on the debtor, as it does in straight bankruptcy.
On the other hand, the debtor will probably allow for his personal liability
when negotiating the plan of arrangement with the creditors.'r In this event,
at least part of the interest expense will be borne by the creditors, precisely
the evil that Saper sought to avoid.2 5
In the usual situation, the estate is sufficient to pay the full tax claim. If
the debtor had any choice in the matter, surely he would pay the claim in full
on the same date that the petition is filed. Then, no post-petition interest could
accrue. Unfortunately, this result is not possible. Operation of law causes significant delays, and post-petition interest will invariably accrue to the debtor's
detriment. It would seem that a trustee should, at least, ameliorate the effect
of Bruning by paying the tax debt as soon as possible. However, court approval
is necessary before any debt may be paid, and a referee could not approve
payment of taxes before it was ascertained that all prior debts could be paid
in full.Y 9 Further, a tax debt, obviously, could not be paid until a claim has
been filed. Under section 57n,130 claims need not be filed for sLx months, and
further extensions may be granted to Government claimants. 3" Despite the fact
that these delays are beyond the debtor's control, Bruning would hold the
debtor personally liable for the interest accruing after filing of the petition.
In order to alleviate the harsh ramifications of the Brnning decision, it is
submitted that an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act is necessary. Congress
has already given tax debts a priority in section 64. This priority could be
124. Bankruptcy Act § 371, 66 Stat. 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1964). Bruning will
not be applied to Chapter X reorganizations since, there, all debts not provided for in the

plan are discharged. Bankruptcy Act § 22S(1), 52 Stat. S99 (1938), 11 U.S.C. r§623(1)
(1964).

125. See notes 99-112 supra and accompanying text.
126. The same principles were also recognized by the disent. See notes 93-111 supra and
accompanying text.
127. See Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 1964 Ann. Survey Am. L. 495, 515.
123.

See text accompanying notes 13-36 supra.

129. See Seligson, supra note 127, at 515.
130. Bankruptcy Act § 57n, 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1964). Section S7n
also applies to arrangement proceedings, Bankruptcy Act § 354, 66 Stat. 433 (1952), 11
US.C. § 755 (1964), and to corporate reorganizations, Bankruptcy Act § 233(3), 66 Stat.

431 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 63S(3) (1964).
131. See Seligson, supra note 127, at 515. At least one commentator has felt that thee
considerations militate for the opposite result in Bruning. See Schwartz, Cotlectibility of
Post-Bankruptcy Interest, 36 Ref. T. 49 (1962).

